past: "medi eval Russia," "medieval Poland," "medieval France," and so on. In this context, families are typically portrayed as stable, monolithic patrilineal entities that descend from an identifiable (semi-or totally mythical) forbear whose line continues for hundreds of years. Those dynasties (e.g., Piast for Poland, Riurikid for Rus', A� rpád for Hungary) are then used as stand-ins for the nation, especially in the absence of other national designators, such as modern governmental institu tions, borders, or ideas of nationhood.
This article challenges both of those categories, the nation and the dynasty, through a case study focused on a historical actor who had no nation and no fam ily-at least not as recognized by contemporary chroniclers or modern histori ans. And because he has been left out of medieval history, his life is an instructive one, shedding light on the ways that medieval polities and medieval families were bound together: it reveals that historical actors situated themselves not in linear dynasties but within kinship webs that allowed them to create situational kinship networks to aid them in times of need.
4 Reconstructing and analyzing these net works is difficult, and it complicates our view of the medieval world in impor tant ways. To take just one brief, general example: the Riurikids and Piasts were intermarried to a great extent during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and the members of these families were intimately involved in one anothers' affairs, most clearly seen in the military sphere. But the history of these interactions, as exem plified by the phrasing of the previous sentence, is written by focusing first on one, then the other, either Riurikid (Rus'/Russia/Ukraine) or Piast (Poland). The inter connectivity of those families, however, makes it clear that these individuals were instead focused on their own affairs, utilizing whichever members of their kinship web were most advantageous to them at a given time, regardless of modern ideas of dynasty or nation. Such a history, of an individual actor situated in a kinship web constructing situational kinship networks, is more difficult to grasp but more accurate, and potentially more interesting, than relying on reified modern para digms read back into the past.
Our unlikely protagonist is one Boris Kolomanovich, whose life of un fulfilled ambitions will illustrate the problems inherent in the way we currently discuss medieval kingdoms and families, and whose fate invites us to better understand the ways that individuals utilized, or constructed, their family dynamic: that par ticular combination of politics and family ties that helped medieval kingdoms negotiate their relationships with one another and the world around them. Boris was an elite male, the son of a king and queen, and as such should be fodder for of a chronicle or even the object of hatred of a chronicler. Because of points one and two, Boris only appears in our sources when he interacts with those who are the subjects of such chronicles: luckily for us, since in his attempt to actualize his dream of rule, Boris traveled through a large swathe of the medieval world, includ ing the kingdoms of Rus', Poland, and Hungary, and the German and Byzantine empires (Map 1).
8 So to write the story of Boris, and to complicate the histories of kingdoms and dynasties, we need to reconstruct his movements and analyze them for what they can tell us about family dynamics and situational kinship roles. Our larger goal is to fashion a new vocabulary that better articulates the ways that medieval people constructed their own medieval globe.
Situational Kinship and Kinship Webs
This new vocabulary for discussing and better understanding medieval family dynamics begins with two terms: kinship webs and situational kinship networks. These two terms set up a framework that allows for a less anachronistic discussion of medieval relationships and, moreover, provides one that is portable throughout much of the medieval world. Their explication here is a necessary first step in lay ing the foundation for the case study of Boris Kolomanovich.
Traditionally, medieval European dynasties are envisioned as patrilineal, such that each male ruler is descended from the prior male ruler whose descent is traced back to the eponymous founder of the dynasty. In Rus', for example, Volodi mer the Great (r. 980-1015) was succeeded by Iaroslav the Wise (sole ruler, 1036-54) who was succeeded by Iziaslav Iaroslavich (r. 1054 Iaroslavich (r. -68, ca. 1069 Iaroslavich (r. -73, ca. 1077 . They were all members of the Riurikid-or, more accurately, the Volodimer ovichi-family and were grandfather, father, and son respectively.
9 What such a depiction does not convey is the horizontal breadth of the Volodimerovichi family itself, since there are no siblings or in-laws present in this simplified picture, and since this larger, more inclusive family model would challenge the modern con ception of medieval families as patrilineal institutions with fixed identities.
As the case of Boris Kolomanovich reveals, families were actually kinship webs that spread horizontally as well as vertically. Marital families were just as 8 This map does not attempt to show the borders of these kingdoms, only major cities. Medieval polities did not have well delineated borders and their territorial complexity cannot be represented in conventional ways. Additionally, the names of these polities are as open to discussion as the names of their ruling families. To take just one wellknown example, Byzantium would have been described as "Rome" or the "Roman Empire" in contemporary Greek primary sources.
important as natal families in finding allies, and in-laws were often the first, not the second, source of such allies when one competed with one's own natal kin. Thus, while named dynasties like the Volodimerovichi, Piasts, and A� rpáds may be referenced for convenience, it is more useful to situate each individual at the cen ter of his or her own web and to track his or her shifting relationships with other family members.
These kinship webs, though, were enormous and often spanned medieval Europe-and beyond. As such they were ineffective as the sole source of identity or support; rather, they served as the base from which subsequent relationships could be built. 10 To create effective alliances, individuals had to select and engage with a subset of that web at various times: the situational kinship network. The purpose of the situational kinship network was to recruit a group of allies, all or most of whom were part of the larger web, to assist in accomplishing a particular goal. Kinship may have been the sine qua non for belonging to, or joining, a situa tional kinship network; but to recruit participants to further a given plan, one had to show that there would be mutual benefit. Such benefits ranged from the very tangible (such as new sources of wealth) to the highly intangible (such as influence in exchange for assistance); in each case, all of the parties involved in a situational kinship network shared a common goal. The situational kinship network might therefore serve to break up one's kinship web for a brief time. With the construc tion of any situational kinship network, an individual might cast a member of his family as X not Y, so as to engage in conflict with Y (who was no longer part of the family at that moment). Such compartmentalization made it much easier to pur sue intra-kin conflicts, which constituted the majority of royal conflicts through out medieval Europe. Finally, situational kinship networks were creations of the moment. They were not designed to be lasting alliances or to permanently divide kin from kin, but to serve a particular purpose. Once the shared objective of the situational kinship network had been reached (e.g., the particular battle won or city taken), the kinship web was re-woven and new situational kinship networks could be created for a new purpose.
11 Such new situational kinship networks often involved family members who only recently had been on opposite sides of a con flict. The malleability of relationships within the larger kinship web helps to dem onstrate the efficacy of situational kinship as a tool for analyzing medieval family interactions-as will be shown in the case study here of Boris Kolomanovich.
Family and Identity
Identity politics-specifically those related to the privileging of a group's shared identity in order to create or increase a sense of group unity-is not just a modern phenomenon. The major category of modern discourse for medieval royalty is the dynasty. However, as noted above, when traced solely patrilineally this represents an ahistorical approach to the everyday interconnectivity of the medieval world displayed here. In recent decades, the study of the medieval world has evolved to include women, and has especially privileged the roles of elite women. 12 But even with that advance, the modern historiographical conception of the medieval fam ily is still arranged around a patrilineal line, and children are designated as part of their father's line solely. This leads, ultimately, to an easy identification of family/ dynasty with nation-and anachronism creeps back into the picture. Instead, it must be remembered that medieval ruling families created and maintained power by forging relationships that stretched across and beyond Europe, constrained by religion (sometimes) and politics, but not by modern boundaries read back into history.
13 The result was a tangled web of relations from which it was, and is, impossible to extract a single individual or to tell a single story. This very complex ity is useful for illustrating the realities of medieval kinship.
In the example used here, Boris, the son of Koloman, was the progeny of a Volodimerovichi woman and an A� rpád man (See Figure 1) . Traditionally, for modern historians, he would be labeled an A� rpád, thus tracing his line of descent through his father (though there were plenty of contemporary claims being based on matrilineal descent at this same time).
14 Alternatively, one could say that he was half-Volodimerovichi and half-A� rpád. And yet the picture is even more compli cated than that. Koloman's father was an A� rpád (again, taking his father's identity as his own, for the sake of discussion), and Koloman's mother was the daughter of a German count (probably). 15 The father of Boris's mother, Evfimiia, has been 14 The civil war in England between Empress Mathilda and Count Stephen of Blois might be the best known example, as both candidates were claiming the throne through a female connection. In Mathilda's case, it was herself, as daughter of King Henry I; in Stephen's, his claim was as the king's nephew, through his mother, the king's sister.
15
There is a great deal of confusion as to the parentage of Koloman and his brother Almos, as they were most likely born prior to the ca. 1075 marriage of their father Geza I and a certain Synadena from Byzantium. Sophia of Loon was, probably, Géza's first wife, but little is designated as a member of the Volodimerovichi (with the same caveat above), and her mother was Gyđa, daughter of Harold Godwinsson, the last Anglo-Saxon king of England. 16 The picture only gets more complicated as one goes back in time and tries to trace the "identity" of each of these individuals. Modern discussions of these families are often distilled into "lines" for convenience but also to privilege the identity of the patrilineal family. For example, the A� rpád line, with all children born to an A� rpád father and labeled as A� rpáds, can be abstracted from this web and equated with "Hungary."
17 But the picture in Figure 1 is much more complex, and in that complexity is buried a host of competing identities that each individual could adopt and exploit over his or her lifetime.
Anachronism must be dealt with when discussing these various family lines. Often these are not solely modern creations: often they are later medieval con structions that get read back into earlier periods and accepted by later historians. To take just one example, the royal family of the kingdom of Rus' is known in mod ern historiography as the Riurikids, named after the eponymous (but mythical) founder of the dynasty, a ninthcentury Viking warrior who was allegedly invited to take control of the lawless people of what would become Rus'.
18 In other words, known about her. The best source for the A� rpád genealogy does not even mention her: Mór, Az Árpádok.
16 See the entries for Boris Kolomanovich, Evfimiia Vladimirovna, and others on "Russian Genealogy" <genealogy.obdurodon.org> (accessed April 26, 2015) .
17 Most any study focused on one particular medieval kingdom or family does this, wittingly or otherwise. For the A� rpád example, see the otherwise excellent book by Engel, Realm of St.
Stephen.
18
The story of Riurik's arrival and the foundation of Rus' is told in Russian Primary Chronicle, CE 862. Riurik is a convenient historical invention designed to legitimize a dynasty, but only at a much later point in time. So the Riurikid name is an anachronism in our period but has continued to be used by historians, as it has become a common place descriptor for this family. 19 The members of this family, in the period with which I am concerned, all self-consciously traced their descent not to Riurik, but to Volodimer Sviatoslavich, the first Christian ruler of Rus'. As such, I have used the descriptor "Volodimerovichi" for this group, as it more accurately reflects how they thought of themselves.
20 Though this is just one example, the same discussion can be had for each of the other groups mentioned here, 21 leaving us with an equal number of problems with attempts to use dynasties as buildingblocks of medi eval politics as with the anachronistic reliance on retroactive kingdoms.
A Reconstructed Life of Boris Kolomanovich
As already noted, the life of Boris Kolomanovich does not conform to many of the normative categories of medieval or modern historiographies, and there fore seems very odd. However, for the purposes of illustrating the dynamics of situational kinship ties within a larger kinship web-as well as for breaking down notions of medieval European history as the history of modern nations read back into the past-it is ideal. Below I offer a sketch of Boris's life derived from a variety of sources, in an effort to identify the kinship web(s) within which he figured and to show how he constructed situational kinship networks as a way to advance his individual goals. Implicit in this story of one man is a larger lesson: that the linear story of one nation or kingdom cannot contain the manifold actors and events that are relevant to the history of that kingdom.
Boris's Parentage and Childhood
Boris's father was Koloman, son of Géza I, pater familias of the A� rpád family and king of the Hungarians (Figure 2 ).
22 Koloman ruled from his capital at Esztergom on the Danube, and his realm was a powerful one, negotiating its difficult position between the German and Byzantine empires by building a web of relations that encompassed most of the European ruling families. Boris's mother was Evfimiia, daughter of Volodimer "Monomakh," one of the most senior (and powerful) members of the Volodimerovichi clan of Rus'; and at the time of Evfimiia's marriage to Koloman in 1112, Volodimer was heir apparent to the throne of Kiev, capital of Rus' (Figure 2) . 23 As of 1113, Volodimer Monomakh became the ruler of Kiev and thus controlled Rus', from the territory of Novgorod in the north to the frontier with the steppe a few days south of Kiev, and from beyond Vladimir in the west, to an ever expanding border in the east: the largest territorial kingdom in Europe at this time.
These were powerful parents, from powerful families, and the circumstances of his birth should have laid the foundation for a highly privileged life for Boris. But beyond the power these families exercised lies a complex story about the nature of dynastic marriages and the politics involved. Koloman had been married previ ously, to Busilla, the daughter of the Norman ruler of Sicily, Roger I.
24 Busilla had died shortly before 1112, along with their firstborn son, Ladislaus. Figure 2) . Thus, even prior to his birth, Boris was already embroiled in this web of kinship connections, the prod uct of a marriage arranged to tie one branch of the A� rpáds to one branch of the Volodimerovichi, in order to oppose another branch of the A� rpáds tied to another branch of the Volodimerovichi. Shortly before Boris's birth in 1113, Koloman repudiated Evfimiia and she was sent home to Rus', where Boris was born.
26 Though there has been some specula tion about the reasons for the repudiation, notably that Koloman must have denied fathering the child, multiple sources record that Boris's father was Koloman.
27
Boris certainly identified himself as such throughout his life, and his main goal was to succeed his father as ruler of the A� rpádian realm of Hungary. Nevertheless, Koloman's repudiation of Evfimiia, and the failure of that marriage alliance, led Koloman to take more drastic steps to preserve his rule and promote that of his son Stephen. In 1113, the same year as the repudiation, Koloman had his brother Almos and his nephew Béla blinded, castrated, and committed to a monastery. 28 Each of these actions individually would have made Almos and Béla ineligible for rule, and their combination was strategically potent. Blinding was a wellknown punish ment, especially in the Roman world of Constantinople, and was used as a humane way to punish usurpers without killing them. 29 The removal of their eyes signaled that they were no longer bodily whole and were thus incapable of rule. Castra tion meanwhile, was intended to prevent them from producing heirs to their line. Committing a rival, especially a younger brother, to a monastery also had a long heritage in medieval Europe, with Pepin the Short's treatment of the Merovin gians in the eighth century as perhaps the most famous example. Despite these tactics' apparent lack of success in this case, since Béla eventually did succeed to the throne and produce offspring, these actions had enormous symbolic value that would have cast doubt upon Almos and Béla and also required them, or their chroniclers, to explain away these actions.
31 Nevertheless, the punishments them selves speak to the strength of Koloman's resolve to preserve the inheritance for his son Stephen, and his line in the face of a rival younger brother. His first attempt to preserve his family's rule had been to craft a marital alliance, while his second attempt was maiming his own close kin, a clear statement of the relative impor tance of marital alliances versus that of blood relations.
At Koloman's death Stephen II, his son by Busilla, succeeded him. Stephen, too, was worried about Almos and Béla, despite his father's efforts, and so he worked to neutralize Almos's alliance with the Volodimerovichi. He did this by repeatedly creating situational kinship networks with Almos's brother-in-law Iaroslav Svi atopolchich against Volodimer Monomakh, themselves antagonistic kin.
32 In this way he fostered goodwill with the family of Sviatopolk Iziaslavich (a key figure in Almos's kinship web) and prevented Almos from calling on this connection to create a situational kinship network to use against Stephen. It is also possible to imagine that Volodimer Monomakh's position as Evfimiia's father lent another motive to Stephen's attacks upon him. In fact, the Chronica de gestis Hungarorum specifically ascribes to Stephen this motive for supporting Iaroslav: "King Stephen, wishing to avenge the injury done to his father, King Coloman, promised the Duke his assistance."
33
Stephen was right to be worried about Almos, but it seems that his strategic counteralliance with the Volodimerovichi had worked in his favor, since when Almos next revolted against him in 1125, he did so by drawing on a different sec tion of his kinship web and fleeing to Constantinople, where he received help from Emperor John II Komnenos-and not from his wife's kin in Rus'. Emperor John II Béla was unable to bring himself to do so, and instead gave the king a dog's testicles in place of the young boy's.
Ibid.
32 There are multiple examples of Hungarian support for Iaroslav in the various chronicles; see, e.g., the Hypatian Chronicle, CE 1118 and 1123. Volodimer Monomakh was also the father of Evfimiia, Stephen's former stepmother, though whether this played into his calculations or not is unknown. It is, perhaps, hard to imagine that it did not play some role in his thinking. Hungarorum, 134. was himself married to an A� rpád princess, the daughter of Koloman's predecessor Ladislaus, and Almos utilized this tie to create a situational kinship network with him.
Chronica de gestis
34 The two, John and Almos, fought with Stephen II several times at the end of the 1120s, until Almos's death in 1129, 35 which brought an end to the conflict. Béla had, it appears, stayed in one monastery or another without leaving the kingdom the whole time, which is where he was found by Stephen II and named as heir in 1131, shortly before Stephen's death. 36 Though we have no source that explains this choice, Stephen had no sons of his own, and it appears that he would rather have his cousin (though son of his mutinous uncle) as his heir, rather than his own repudiated half-brother Boris. Indeed, this succession may have prompted Boris's initial campaign to gain the throne of Hungary.
Boris Attempts to Claim His Birthright
It has been assumed that Boris spent his childhood in Rus' with his mother, 37 but he does not appear in any contemporary sources until the early 1130s, and when he does appear, it is as a fully grown political actor. The succession of Béla II to the A� rpádian throne was a slight to Boris as the son of Koloman, and this most likely motivated his first attempt to claim it for himself in 1132, when he was eighteen or nineteen years old.
38 Boris's bid for power was directly preceded by the exten sion of his kinship web: at some point prior to that year, he had married Judith, the daughter of the Piast ruler of Poland, Bolesław III (See Figure 3) . 39 This created a 
38
The general practice of the A� rpáds had been lateral, or collateral, succession with only a few deviations (or attempted deviations); thus Koloman's children should all have ruled before the succession passed to Koloman's younger brother's family. John Kinnamos discusses the inheritance system of the A� rpáds, specifically noting it as lateral, when he discusses the inheritance of Géza II: Deeds, book 5:1. It is also worth noting, as motivation, the killing of the nobles who had supported the blinding of Béla: a deed ascribed to his wife Elena, and which the Chronica de gestis Hungarorum (136-37) cites as the cause of the Hungarian nobles' invitation to Boris in the first place. (Figure 3 ). 40 Such a change illustrates the complicated nature of situational kinship networks, as well as Bolesław's apparent acceptance of Boris's birthright, and his claim to the Hungarian throne. 41 The kinship web that encompassed Bolesław (and all medieval rulers) connected him to a host of mutually antagonistic people and causes. Family ties, because of this, did not mean a guarantee of immediate assistance. Instead, they were often simply the foundation for requesting assistance, and were superseded by the active construction of situational kinship networks to create alliances for a particular cause. Situational kinship networks allowed for a medieval realpolitik in which brothers in-law might support each other in one campaign, but find themselves on opposite sides of another campaign a few years later, while all along being part of the same Balzer in his Genealogia Piastów (Table 3) has subsequently suggested that this was instead Géza II, son of Béla II. However, the majority of sources that discuss Géza II only mention his marriage to Evfrosiniia Mstislavna (one of the Volodimerovichi), and all of his known children are assumed to be hers. Thus, we are left with a historical conundrum due to a lack of specific evidence. Mór (Az Árpádok, 257-80) discusses this marriage as at least a possibility. kinship web. Bolesław understood that by marrying his daughter to Boris, he was choosing a side against Béla II and potentially involving himself, his family, and his kingdom in a war for the Hungarian throne. This was not an uncommon position for the Piasts to be in: Bolesław III and his Piast predecessors had already demon strated ambitions to influence the A� rpád succession.
42
Béla II responded by activating a situational kinship network of his own. He called upon his brother-in-law Soběslav, the Přemyslid ruler of the Bohemians, who was married to Adelheid, Béla's sister (See Figure 3) . 43 Soběslav had inherited the throne in 1125 but had had an eventful life of struggle before that, with his older brother Vladislav. That struggle was often supported by Bolesław III, 44 who was Soběslav's nephew and cousin. 45 This was an odd change of kinship allegiances for Soběslav and reflects the utility of situational kinship networks, as opposed to the static, linear relationships reflected in genealogical charts. Béla, like Boris, also expanded his kinship web, marrying his other sister, Hedwig, to Adalbert, the son of Margrave Leopold III of Austria (see Figure 3) . 46 This new relationship tied Béla into the powerful Babenberg family of Leopold III and allowed him to create situ ational kinship networks not just with Adalbert but with other members of that larger kinship web. 47 Ibid. It should also be noted that there were additional positive outcomes for Béla, including building an alliance with the rulers in Austria, with whom he shared a border; allowing him to defeat Bolesław III's gambit to gain more power over the Hungarians; and allowing him to build a closer relationship with Emperor Lothar III.
members of his kinship web.
48 The details of the battle are few, but the contem porary chronicler Otto of Freising records that it ended in Boris and Bolesław's flight, losing many men in the process. 49 This one battle would also bring an end to Boris's first attempt on the Hungarian throne, as the German emperor, Lothar III, intervened to negotiate an armistice between the sides at Merseburg, which also effectively ended Bolesław III's support of Boris's claim. 50 One can speculate that Lothar III did this because the wide-ranging conflict had involved two A� rpáds, the Piast and Přemyslid rulers, and many of his own German nobles. 51 This level of involvement was the almost inevitable result of the kinship webs that underlay the family dynamics of medieval elites. When situational kinship networks were activated, as in this instance, they could still span several kingdoms and tradi tional dynasties. And though such conflict could be contained, in that it included only a subset of a larger kinship web, it had the potential to draw in more and more people if it progressed-hence Lothar III's intervention and the relatively short campaigns that traditionally accompanied such conflicts.
Boris does not appear to have renewed his claim again during Béla II's reign, but he did continue to expand his kinship web, notably by marrying a relative of Emperor John II Komnenos, prior to the Byzantine emperor's death in 1143.
52
While this marriage represents a renewal of the A� rpád-Komneni ties mentioned above (which had also been instrumental to Almos), it did not serve an immediate purpose in Boris's quest to reach the Hungarian throne. Indeed, Boris is absent not just because the focus of the sources was trained elsewhere, but because of the nature of his campaigns to gain the throne. Boris did not have much support from within the A� rpád kingdom, and he required outside assistance in each of his attempts. In part, this is because he had little support or visibility within the A� rpád kingdom. Though Otto of Freising records that Hungarian nobles had invited him to make his first attempt on the throne in 1132, they disappear quickly from the account, and the focus is on Boris and Bolesław III. 53 Boris's most potent allies, as we have seen, came from elsewhere in Europe and were the product of Boris's 48 Otto of Freising, Two Cities, book 7:21. It is also useful to recognize that Bishop Otto was also the son of Margrave Leopold, and thus linked to these events personally: Mierow's n. 105 in this tranlsation. use of situational kinship networks to assist him. Moreover, the various conflicts that were raging across Europe during this decade prevented him from capitaliz ing on any of the relationships in his kinship web. The German empire descended into war soon after Lothar III negotiated the peace at Merseburg, with Lothar and many of his nobles campaigning against Roger II of Sicily; after Lothar's death in 1137, the empire descended into civil war. 54 The Piasts were similarly disarrayed after Bolesław III's death in 1138, when his sons fought against each other to suc ceed him.
55 Meanwhile, Boris's new kinsman John II Komnenos was focused upon his eastern frontier, waging several wars over Antioch and the surrounding area.
56
This removed some of the major possibilities for forging situational kinship net works and further illustrates the fragile nature of the enterprise that Boris had undertaken. It was reliant not only upon constructed kinship networks and the goodwill or avarice of family members, but also upon the political opportunities available in western Eurasia.
Boris's Second Attempt on the Throne
Boris's marriage to a Komnena was undoubtedly an important part of his kinship web, but his second attempt on the throne of the A� rpáds, this time against Béla II's son Géza II, originated not from Komneni territory but from German territory. The situational kinship network that Boris constructed for his attempt in 1146 sheds even more light on the complex family dynamics embedded in the medieval kinship web. In this instance, Boris was supported by the new Přemyslid ruler of the Bohemians, Vladislav II, as well as by Vladislav II's wife Gertrude; whereas in 1132, the Přemyslid ruler Soběslav had opposed him. 57 The intervening decade had not only witnessed a change in rule amongst the Bohemians, from Soběslav to Vladislav II, but also a change in the political calculations of the Přemyslids relative to Boris. The reason for this is not clear, though one might conjecture that Vladislav II, as the son of Soběslav's elder brother and rival Vladislav, was acting to block the interests of a rival branch of his own Přemyslid family. 58 In which case, 58 There was a history of trouble between these families that continued after the death of ideNTiTy iN FlUX 31
Vladislav II's participation in an alliance had little to do with Boris himself but was instead calculated to benefit Vladislav II and harm the supporters of Soběslav, while also helping Boris achieve his goal. For Boris, however, Vladislav's support was crucial, since he needed access to Vladislav's kinship web. Vladislav II and Gertrude introduced Boris to Emperor Conrad III, Gertrude's brother and founder of the new Hohenstaufen line of German rulers, to whom Boris appealed for assistance (Figure 4) . 59 Conrad, swayed by the presence of his sister and brother-in-law (Otto of Freising tells us), 60 agreed to assist Boris in his attempt on the Hungarian throne. The support of Conrad III, combined with that of Vladislav II and Gertrude, was crucial in raising the soldiers necessary for Boris to attack the border fortress of Pressburg, though neither Vladislav II nor Conrad III participated personally in the military conflict.
61 But even more essential than military support was the tacit assistance that tends not to be stressed by chroni clers: the lack of interference from the wide ranging kin network to which Ger trude and Conrad III belonged (see Figure 4 ). This network allowed Boris largely free rein and helped to mitigate any assistance that Géza II might seek. Boris was also of aid to this network, as he provided a casus belli for Henry II, the Babenberg margrave of Austria (and half-brother of Conrad III) with whom the A� rpáds shared an uneasy border, to once again go to war against his Hungarian neighbors.
62 Boris thus led a mixed army that included Hungarian adherents of his own, some Ger man nobles, and mercenaries hired by Vladislav II, against the border fortress of Pressburg (Map 1).
63 Boris and his supporters took the fortress, but their victory was short-lived. Géza II led a counterattack, stopping just short of the fortress and bribing Boris's supporters to abandon him. 62 Henry II's position is even more complex than one can see here, as he was also the brother of Adalbert, husband of Béla II's sister Hedwig. The kinship webs of medieval royals stretched far and wide and inevitably, many of the people with whom one came into conflict were within one's kinship webs. Thus, the creation of situational kinship networks to create networks for conflict management and to erect "firewalls" within kinship webs. German territory, where Géza subsequently pursued him, and there continued his attack by fighting and defeating Henry II (Figure 4 ).6 5 66
In the end, Géza needed no more assistance than his treasury to defeat Boris by bribing his soldiers, but his subsequent actions, including the attack on Henry II after Boris's flight, 67 shows that he understood the extent of the situational kin ship network backing Boris-including the role of those members that partici pated in nonmilitary ways. Following these events, Conrad III also felt the pain of his involvement with Boris, as Géza broke off the marriage agreement previously arranged between Conrad III's son and Géza's sister. 68 Conrad's attempt to go on crusade the next year was also affected by the repercussions of his involvement in Boris's attempt on Géza's throne, since Géza forced Conrad to negotiate the terms of his army's passage through Géza's kingdom. 69 The possible gain to the partici pants is often what encouraged people to join these situational kinship networks 65 Henry II, margrave of Austria, is also Henry XI, duke of Bavaria.
66 Ibid. Henry is an interesting figure in this regard, as he is half-brother to Conrad III and brother to Otto of Freising. Henry and Conrad III are the main objects of Géza's attack and Boris is not mentioned at all in the two Hungarian sources. See "Annales Posonienses," CE 1145; Chronica de gestis Hungarorum, 137-38. Boris, and his claim, may also have been used by Henry XI as a pretext for war against his neighbors; see below. and support a particular cause. But it must also be acknowledged that there were negative costs to these relationships as well.
Boris's Life and Death in Byzantium
Deprived of further assistance from his allies in the region, Boris turned to his wife's kin in Constantinople. However, getting there involved crossing Géza's king dom. He succeeded in doing so in the company of Louis VII, the Capetian king of the Franks, who allowed him to come along precisely because of the kinship web that Boris had built. In allowing Boris passage with his army, Louis is recorded to have said that he was doing so because of Boris's marriage to a Komnena. 70 This indicates not a specific relationship with the Capetians, or to Louis's family at all, but it once again emphasizes the importance, not just of specific relationships between individuals (or families), but the larger ramifications of those relation ships for others. That tie to the imperial family was important to Louis because of the assistance he knew that he would require from the Komneni once he reached Constantinople, in order to begin his crusade. Thus, Boris's relationship with an entirely different family, from a different region of Europe, created a rationale for the Frankish king's assistance, thereby antagonizing the king of the Hungarians.
71
Once in Constantinople, Boris furthered the efforts of his wife's cousin, Man uel Komnenos, to overthrow Géza II, or at least to harm him. Manuel was already involved in ongoing hostilities with Géza II, due to Géza's (and his father-in-law Ban Beloš's) inroads into Roman territory in the Balkans. It is unclear whether Manuel ever planned to place Boris on the throne of the A� rpáds, but his claim was certainly used to antagonize Géza during their campaigns. 72 For instance, while Géza II was absent from his kingdom in 1151, Manuel led a massive invasion of Hungarian territory, with Boris as part of his entourage.
73 When Géza heard of this attack and returned, Manuel deployed Boris and his soldiers to raid deeper into Hungarian territory, drawing Géza away from Manuel's forces. The Byzan tine chronicler John Kinnamos records that Géza chased Boris more because of his identity as a rival, than because of the damage that he was doing.
74 Boris's partici Boris led a campaign of raids into Hungarian territory, where he was killed by a Cuman arrow-though it is unclear (ironically) which army this Turkic mercenary was supporting.
76
Boris's death (at the age of 43) brought an end to his personal struggle for the throne of the A� rpáds, but it coincided with the arrival in Byzantium of more claim ants to that throne. Around 1157, Manuel Komnenos married his niece Maria to Stephen, Géza II's own brother and rival, who had just fled to Byzantium looking for assistance. Manuel's extension of his kinship web to these new A� rpád exiles, Stephen and his brother Ladislaus, gave him options for creating new and more effective situational kinship networks to utilize against Géza II. This might also call into question the motive of the Cuman who killed Boris: was he working for Géza II or Manuel Komnenos? In the final analysis, all of these actors shared a kinship web, but with whom they chose to make situational kinship networks was a shift ing proposition, one that did not favor Boris Kolomanovich in the long term.
Conclusion-and Suggestions for a New Historical Methodology
The story of Boris Kolomanovich could simply be that of one man attempting to claim a throne, and subsumed within the frame of Hungarian history. But, as shown here, it actually gives us a window into a much larger world. It also allows us to challenge some of the traditional ideas about family organization and identity that have structured the discourse of medieval history for generations. But where does all of this leave us in our investigation and what paths forward does it offer?
One conclusion that can be drawn from this story is that the current way of writing medieval European history, exemplified here by the history of eastern Europe, is insufficient and inaccurate. Writing a history of "Hungary," even while taking account of "foreign" interactions and affairs, cannot accurately represent the ways and the extent to which the elites of the medieval world were intercon nected. The path forward then is to begin to think and write about any and all 75 Kinnamos, Deeds, book 3:19. 76 Otto of Freising, Deeds, book 2:52. It is unclear simply from the text for whom the Cumans were working as mercenaries. Urbansky suggests that the Cumans were in the pay of Géza II, rather than the Byzantines: Byzantium and the Danube Frontier, [80] [81] medieval territories without modern nations read back in time, and with medi eval political boundaries only tentatively outlined. The peregrinations of medieval people were not limited to those of traveling merchants but were part of elite life as well, and placing firm boundaries around a kingdom is a modern phenomenon rather than a medieval one. A new type of medieval political history would begin with an acknowledgement that there were medieval borders-but historians would need to be willing to follow the stories and the characters wherever they might lead.
Another possible path forward, demonstrated here, is to focus on families and their relationships to these territories while avoiding the common tendency to substitute the ruling family (the A� rpáds in this case) for a nation or kingdom (Hungary) so that the anachronistic situation discussed above is replicated. One corrective to this, suggested here, would be to focus on situational kinship net works and their effects on identity. Boris Kolomanovich seems to have altered his identity several times during his lifetime, to best take advantage of the opportuni ties afforded by these networks. He emphasized his marital relationships when he needed assistance from his father-in-law Bolesław III, as well as when seeking support from his cousinsinlaw, the Komeneni, or even when gaining safe passage from Louis VII. But he emphasized his natal relations when attempting to motivate supporters within Hungarian territory, both in 1132 and 1146. Due to such com plexities, it would be difficult to label Boris as A� rpád, Volodimerovichi, Piast, or Komneni throughout his life. Instead, he was enmeshed in a kinship web wherein he had access to each of those identities, and possibly more, and was able to iden tify as each situationally, in pursuit of his goal. The resulting situational kinship networks which Boris created allowed him to attempt to claim the crown of the A� rpáds, but they also reveal a new way to look at the complicated kinship webs of medieval politics that is broadly applicable across the medieval globe.
